HEGEL'S CONCEPT OF PRESENTATION
Robert Grant MeR \1 P RECISEL y how we are to understand the deployment and movement of moments within the Lnzyklopddie is a question which reccives no ciear answer l'rom Hegel's writings themselves. Nowhere does he orrer us a 'method of presentation' delineated as such, and at the end orthe system we are simply told that the concept of philosophy is the logical, but with the signification that it is universality certified in concrete content as in its actuality.1 Of course the manner in which we conceive the logical as certiried in concrete content and as a spiritual result can take on different nuances, depending on whether we view the logical as abstracted from concrete spiritual life or as the absolute pr/us of spirit in general. It is this nuance which leads us, correspondingly, to seek a mechanism of presentation valid for the deployment of moments within the system as a whole either within the speculative analysis of spiritual externalization and recollection or within the pure element of the logical concept.
Sorne recent research, in fact, has suggested that we are to find such a mechanism of presentation good for the entire system within Hegel's Wissenschaft der Logik, and particularly in that section devoted to the the Doctrine of Essence. P.-J. Labarrière and G. Jarczyk suggest in the 'Présentation' to their new translation orthe Doctrine of Essence that such an original mechanism of absolute self-présentation is to be round in the movement of reflection, in which is expressed the ontological structure of everything that is, in its negative universality. 2 If this mechanism exists, then of course they are justified in describing the retlection-moment as a "rundamental referential structure" and a "fundamental rhythmic cell", since this mechanism would go a long way in explaining not only the deployment of moments within the Logik, but would greatly clarify the systematic structure peculiar to the Enzyklopadie as a whole. Our immediate task, then, is to try to understand the role of ref1ection within Hegel's Wissenschaji der Logik, and what implications this role may have for the naturc of presentation within the system itself.
Limiting our discussion now to the greater Logik, why is it, then, that we are to fînd the original structure of presentation in the Doctrine of Essence, and more 
331
precisely in the first chapter describing positing ref1ection, extcrnal retlcction, and determining retlection, rather than, for example, in the l'irst chapter of the Subjective Logic describing the universal, particular and individual concept? The response to this question rests largely in the position of essence as the middle and mediating term in the logical syllogism of being-essencc-conccpt, so that the movement of reflection which mediates externality with recollection and interiorization supersedes the simply external transition or 'going-over' characteristic of being. In other words, essence determines the deploymcnt of the first part of the Logik (Quality, Quantity, and Measure), in its raie as the timeless past or background (Hintergrund) of being under its logical universality. Hegel says that, "Not until knowing inwardizes, recollects itself out of immediate being, does it through this mcdiation find essence. The German language has preserved essence in the past participlc (gewesen) of the verb to be; for essence is past -but timelcssly past -being."} The movement of retlection negates and mediates the immediate determinations and transitions of being, through the recollection that these determinations are in fact posited. Such a 'recollection' is possible in the first instance because, as the negation of being, essence is being for-itself, i.e., simply negative self-relation, and must differentiate the determinations which are implicit in it. The process of differentiation and determining remains within this self-relation and is neither a becoming nor a transition, and although the determinations arc in a sense self-subsistent, they are not 'other' because they rest associated within the unit y of being-for-itself. While essence is at first simple negativity, through the movement of ref1cction it is subsequently led to posit the determinateness that is implicit in it, in order to give itself determinate being.
Of course this entire process of positing and recollection hingcs on the fact that the negativity of essence is reflection, whereby the determinations arc retlected, posited by essence itself, and remain in essence as superseded. 4 It is by means of this movement of retlection that essence gives itself a determinate being that is equal to its being-in-itself, -the 'posited' immediacy of the concept. However it is not our intention at this time to work through the dialectic of position and recollection by which essence attains actuality, but rather to understand the mechanism of reflection itself, through which essence 'presents' those determinations that are already present at hand.
In the Doctrine of Essence we see that the discussion of reflection follows immediately on those sections with which this second book of the Logik begins, the 'Essential and the Unessential' and 'Illusory Being'. This is significant because Hegel identifies Illusory Being with the description of appearance attained by scepticism and Kantian idealism, and we may infer l'rom this allusion that if we are to go beyond critical philosophy then we must understand the manner in which appearance become actual, i.e., we must understand the mechanism of retlection. 5 The study of this mechanÎsm then leads directly on ta the determinations of retlection. -identity. difference, and contradiction, -by which we comprehend the categories and their dialectical self-movement at work within ail reality. Therefore it is through the explication of the mechanism of ret1ection that we are taken l'rom the unknowablc thing-in-itself of Kant to the posited thing of Hegel, and contributes not a little to our understanding of how the actual is rational.
The movement of retlection is the negating of negation and is consequently selfrelation, since the negation is present in such wise that it has its being in its negatedness, as i11usory being. The becol11ing of essence, then, unlike that of being which is relation to other, is the movement of nothing to nothing and 50 back to itself. In essence it is rather the negating of nothing that constitutes being. and this pure absolute ref1ection that is this movel11ent determines itself further as positing, external, and deterl11ining ref1ection.
However in the discussion of positing retlection we learn t hat the immediacy of illusory being itself is not the 'starting point'. since its il11mediacy is onl)' as the return of the negative into itself, and is, therefore, a self-superseding immediac)' or positedness. As Hegel says, "Accordingly, the return of essence is its self-repulsion. In other words, retlection-into-self is essentially the presupposing of that l'rom which it is the return. ,. 6 This presupposition of an immediacy l'rom which ref1ection returns is in truth a positing beeause this immediacy only comes to be through being Jeft behind and superseded. Presupposing ref1ection is positing ref1ection and vice versa, and it is reflection because the superseding is at the sa me time a coincidence with itself. -i.e., the positedness is an immediacy that is not distinct t'rom the return-toself and is itself only this movement of return.
The transition to external retlection cornes about when we understand this positedness as immediately apposed to something, to an 'other', whereby retlection is determinate. And as determinate, ref1ection has a presupposition, starts l'rom the immcdiate as its ather, and is external. But this time the immediacy which ref1ection presupposes is itself as superseded, so that it is reJated to itself as to its non-being. We may say that the immediacy which external ref1ection presupposes is no! only positedness but self-relation as such, with the consequence that the determinations posited by external ret1ection in the immediate are to that extent external to the latter.
Of course external ref1ection is also a positing of the immediate and the supersession of this positing in so far as it presupposes the immediate. And the supersession of the immediate is equally a positing because the immediate from which external retlection seemed to st art as something alien is only in this supersession. Hegel concJudes that, "In this way, the immediate is not only in itse/fthat means, for us, or in external ret1ection -identica/ with ref1ection, but this identiealness is posited." 7 Thus the externality of retlection is superseded and its positing is the union of itself with the immediate, 50 that this union is now the immediacy of essence, -essence in and for itself. When the self-relation of ref1ection is freely for-itself it is determining rel1ection, that is, the unit y of positing and external rel1ection. Positing rel1ection starts l'rom nothmg, it has no presupposition, and positedness as such is not yet a determination of ret1ection since it is only determinateness as negation in general. But external rel1ection starts from immediate being and is in unit y with this positing, with the result that this kind of rel1ection is a presupposing which posits the determinateness as determinateness of itself. Hegel states the matter concisely when he says that positedness as such is negation, -but as presupposed, it is ref1ected into itself and so a determination of rel1ection. 8 In contrast with the sphere of being where negation as quality is simply affirmative, the determination of rel1ection persists not through being but through its equality with itself.
Determining ref1ection accordingly effects a reconciliation of the two aspects of positing and ref1ection-into-self, through which determining ret1ection is rcflcction that has come torth from itself. Or, as Hegel says, «In so far, as it is the positedcness that is at the same time ref1ection-into-self, the determinateness of retlection is the relation to its otherness within itsell "') 'l'hus the process of presentation is 'closcd' through retlection ta king its otherness back into itself and superseding its positedness with;n an infinite self-relation. But this does not mean that the independance of the other is totally dissolved, for within this relation-to-self the posited determination abides by having brought into subjection its transitoriness and mere positedness. If essence, as infinite return-to-self, is to be a movement through distinct moments and absolute self-mediation, th en the discrete character of its self-externalizations must persist through the supersession and recollection of the return.
Having brietly sketched out the mechanism of ref1ection as we find it described in the Doctrine of Essence, let us now return to our original question, -as to whelher we can see in ref1ection a 'referential structure' basic to the mode of presentation in the Logik as a whole. Certainly there is some indication that it is only in essence that we comprehend determinate being as posited being or positedness, and that there is a general correlation between the determinations within the sphere of being and the movement of ref1ection. However the suggestion that reflection equally structures the deployment of Subjective Logic is somewhat more problematic. While the immediacy of being is shown in essence to be mediated by the movement of retlection, is it not also true that 'the new immediacy which has become' characteristic of the concept, particularly in the transition to Objectivity, equally super se des and puts by this mediation within a higher, more inclusive configuration ') Indeed Hegel remarks that, "objectivity is the immediacy to which the Concept determines itself by the supersession of its abstraction and mediation." Ir) If in this return to an immediacy that has become the mediation of essence is superseded, then we must assume, too, that the mechanism of ref1ection is also somehow superseded. But this in itself need not diminish the claim that retlection is a referential structure: the immediacy of being is equally superseded by the mediation of essence and yet this immediacy abides within essence in the form of existence, actuality. and substantiality, not to mention 'posited immediacy' generally. The new immediacy of Objectivity within the Subjective Logic is no less 'posited' and hence presupposes the return-to-self explicated by the mechanism of retlection, through which a1l externality is recollected as self-externalization. Ret1ection explains the manner by which essence mediates being and concept, and while the JogicaJ progressions l'rom being to essence and essence to concept are important transitionpoints. it is nonetheless retlection which holds the whole together within a single mcdiating process. In terms of the binary structure of the Logik, we might say that the reconciliation of the subject-object brought about by the mechanism of ret1ection, and existing as an immediacy that has become, is under an objective determinatiol1, so tbat it simply remains for this reconciliation to be realized within the realm of suhjectivity. -indicating a shift in focus rather than a change in the process.
1 n any case the transition l'rom an immediacy 10 an immediacy 'become' can only be understood by means of sorne kind of mediation, and it is only in essence. and especially in the movement of retlection, that we understand the dynamics of Ihis mediation in its logical universality. But if we accept that reflection is a referential structure for the greater Logik, then, certainly, we must extend this daim to take in the entire system, II and with this broadening of the discussion new problems arise in the attcmpt to isolate a universal mode of presentation. First and foremost therc is the total absence of any description of positing, external, and determining retlection within the smaller Logic of the Enzyklopiidie, which is a strange fate for a referential structure. 12 Hegel now explains the determinations of being not through the deployment or 'positing' characteristic of the movement of ret1ection, but through the one concept which is "the underlying prineiple (Substantielle) of ail" 13 : this would seem to suggest that the structural parallels within the determinations of being and essence are less the result of a meehanism of retlection than the immanent movement of the concept. 14 White the Logic of the system states that essence inc1udes the categories of metaphysic and the sciences in gencral, it docs not provide us a mechanism or fundamental structure by which these categories are posited: instead, it asserts that Il. 11 is with this larger claim that Labarrière and Jarczyk close thcir argument for a referential structure in the UJgik: "Ainsi donc, il n'est point de danger de placer trop haut l'importance et la portée ,péculativc de 'La Doctrine de l'Essence'. En elle s'expose bien, dans son formalisme premier, 'la ,tfllcture ontologique de tout cc qui est' -et bien au-delà du 'concept du concept': Jusqu'au 'concept adéquat', ou encore jusqu'au 'concept complètement posé' qui, au travers et au-delà de la Subjectivité el de l'Objectivité de la 'Logique subjective' ressaisies dans leur fondamentale unité, porte jmqu'aux limites extrêmes du Système -expression la plus complexe mais aussi la plus exactement prnportionnée il son objet de la Réflexion totale, entendue comme réflexion posante, réflexion extérieure ct rétlexion déterminante." op. cil. p. XXIV f. 12~ This is an unforlunate lack became the three syllogisms which close the system seem to give the Loglc prImac] in the neeessary, structural mediation of the whole (#577), and if it could be shown that this Logic itself contained a referential structure, th en the larger daim for its importance would be simply a. mJ.tter ot inft'rcncc, 13 Enc. "114 R. p. 124. 14. ln other words the 'rckrential structure' of the LUKik lS rep1accd in the system b\' the sclfciitlercntiating who1c.
they are the products of reflective understanding. 15 Thus in place of an explanation of the dynamic of externalization and recollection in its logical universality, we are referred to a moment of consciousness within subjective spirit, a moment anterior to, and susperseded by, reason. Certainly there is at least implicit in this reference the suggestion that the manner by which the categories of science are posited is best studied within the realm of spirit, and, in particular, within the sciences of phenomenology and psychology. Indeed, the movement of reflection is given the greatest attention within the system as it is manifest in consciousness, which is described by Hegel as constituting the grade of reflection for spirit. 16 Again, when reflection is dealt with more extensively within the Logic of the system, such as in the 'Precise Concept and Division of Logic', it cornes into po or comparison with the movement of the dialcctic. Hegel says that, "Rel1ection is at tïrst the going out beyond the isolated determinateness and a reference ta it, whereby this dèterminateness is posited in relation and, at the same time, left its isolated worth. Dialectic, on the other hand, is the immanent going out, where the onesidedness and limitation of the determinations of understanding are presented as they are, that is, as their own negation. Everything finite is this, the supersession of itself." 17 In ter ms of the scheme outlined in the larger Logik, the reflection described by Hegel above seems to be more exactly 'external' reflection, for the aspect of positive presentation (Darstellung) associated with 'determining' reflection is here aligned totally with the dialectic, and in contrast with ret1ection in general. It should also bc rcmarked that within this passage from the system wc find a new distinction between the positing of reflective understanding and the presenting of dialcctical reason, which may indicate that the positing of ret1ection as we have discussed it was no longer considered to be the model or referential structure for presentation by the later Hegel of the Enzyklopadie.
Ali in ail, there is some evidence to suggest that the mechanism of reflection is important, even essential, to our understanding of the mode of presentation in the Logik, but that, in addition, this importance seems to have diminished greatly within the system. Presentation in the latter is not related 10 any one referential structure, -rather, il achieves darity and determinateness with each successive configuration as the immanent process of the whole, and which attains its highest definition in the presentation special to philosophy. If this is the case, i.e., that there is no single referential structure of presentation good for the entire system, then it would appear that an interpretive approach consisting of a 'phenomenology' of ail possible structures of presentation demands our attention. This does not mean that we cannat use the mechanism of rel1ection as a model for referencc in cxamining the presèntation characteristic, for instance, of spirit, but that wc must be circumspect in claiming for il universal applicability.
However there is a second implication to be derived l'rom our investigation of the mechanism of reflection within the Enzyklopâdie. The Doctrine of Essence in the lesser Logic not only gives short shrift to the mechanism of reflection, in its place it refers us to the derivation of categories within ref1ective understanding. In fact il is within the chapter dealing with consciousness in the Philosophy of Spirit that we find the mast extensive discussion of reflection. so that, apparently, if we are to understand the origination of the categories of science and their presentation then we must examine first and foremost the spiritual mode of self-presentation peculiar to labour. The mode of presentation that we t'ind in labour is, of course, itself deficient and does not adequatcly explain the deployment of moments within the system since labour, too, is included and superseded within the higher moments or language creation and philosophie presentation. lndeed, if there is no fundamental referential structure within the lesser Logic, and if reflection itself is regarded as a lower spiritual moment within the system, then it would seem that such a structure of presentation would better be identified with philosophic presentation itsclf, as that moment which closes absolute self-manifestation and is the presupposition for ail prior, even logical. configurations. This identification brings with it two suggestions for furthcr research, first that we interprct the presentation described by retlection in the greater LOf{ik l'rom the stand point of the necessities special to philosophic presentation, and second that we examine the adequacy of language as that element within which the presented certification of the logical occurs.
